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Abstract
We study fair division of indivisible goods in a single-parameter environment. In particular,
we develop truthful social welfare maximizing mechanisms for fairly allocating indivisible goods.
Our fairness guarantees are in terms of solution concepts which are tailored to address allocation
of indivisible goods and, hence, provide an appropriate framework for fair division of goods.
This work specifically considers fairness in terms of envy freeness up to one good (EF1), maximin
share guarantee (MMS), and Nash social welfare (NSW).
Our first result shows that (in a single-parameter environment) the problem of maximizing
welfare, subject to the constraint that the allocation of the indivisible goods is EF1, admits a
polynomial-time, 1/2-approximate, truthful auction. We further prove that this problem is NP-
Hard and, hence, an approximation is warranted. This hardness result also complements prior
works which show that an arbitrary EF1 allocation can be computed efficiently.
We also establish a bi-criteria approximation guarantee for the problem of maximizing social
welfare under MMS constraints. In particular, we develop a truthful auction which efficiently
finds an allocation wherein each agent gets a bundle of value at least (1/2− ε) times her maximin
share and the welfare of the computed allocation is at least the optimal, here ε > 0 is a fixed
constant. We complement this result by showing that maximizing welfare is computationally
hard even if one aims to only satisfy the MMS constraint approximately. Our results for EF1 and
MMS are based on establishing interesting majorization inequalities. We also observe that the
problem of maximizing NSW in a single parameter environment admits a truthful polynomial-
time approximation scheme.
1 Introduction
Fairness is a fundamental consideration in many real-world allocation problems. Course assign-
ment [OSB10] and inventory pricing [Rot11] are just two examples of such settings. These two ap-
plications, in particular, entail allocation of discrete1 resources and, by contrast, classical notions of
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1That is, goods which cannot be fractionally assigned to the agents.
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fairness typically address divisible2 goods [Str80; Mou04; BT95]. While envy-free3 and proportional4
allocations always exist for divisible goods, such guarantees do not hold when the goods are indi-
visible: consider a single discrete good which has to be allocated between two agents. Here, in any
allocation, the losing agent will be envious and will not achieve proportionality.
This gap has been addressed in recent years by efforts that focus on fair division of indivisible
goods, see, e.g., [LR16]. This thread of research has lead to an in-depth study of solution concepts
which better capture the combinatorial aspects of allocating indivisible goods. Arguably, the three
most prominent notions of fairness in this line of work are envy freeness up to one good (EF1), maximin
share guarantee (MMS), and Nash social welfare (NSW). These notions have been well substantiated
by the development of complementary existential results, efficient algorithms, and implementations,
such as Course Match and Spliddit [PW14; Bud11; GHS+18; CKM+16; BKV18b; LMMS04; CG15;
OSB10; GP15].
However, almost all of this work is confined to settings where the valuations of the agents are
known, i.e., to nonstrategic settings.5 The present paper complements the literature on fair division
of indivisible goods by considering this problem in a strategic setting.
In particular, we focus on settings in which indivisible goods have to be auctioned off among
strategic agents/bidders in single-parameter environments. In these well-studied environments, the
valuation of each strategic bidder i (over goods) decomposes into the agent’s private valuation pa-
rameter, vi ∈ R+, and a (global) public value summarization function w : 2[m] 7→ R+, here m is the
set of goods, see, e.g., [GKW10] and [Rot17]. Specifically, the valuation of agent i for a subset of
goods S ⊆ [m] is given by vi(S) := viw(S), where vi ∈ R+ is the private parameter of i and w(·) is a
summarization function common across all bidders.
Single-parameter environments are of fundamental importance in mechanism design. Indeed, the
foundational result of Myerson [Mye81] is applicable within this framework and these environments
are used to model several important applications, e.g., (i) Ad auctions [EOS07; Var07] and (ii) Strategic
load balancing [AT01]: (i) Ad auctions are run in real time—every time a user submits a keyword for
web search—to assign slots (prominent positions on the webpage) to sponsored advertisements. The
auction is used to determine which advertisers’ links are displayed, in what order, and the payment
charged to them. Here, each slot (i.e., each auctioned good) is associated with a probability with
which it will receive a click from the user. These click-through rates correspond to the public value
summarization function w and the per-click value of bidder i is modeled by the private valuation
parameter vi. (ii) In the load-balancing context the weight of the loads (e.g., the size of computational
jobs) gives us w and the strategic agent’s private parameter vi is the (processing) cost she incurs per
unit load.
Our problem formulations are broadly motivated by the fact that fairness is an important con-
cern in many such applications of single-parameter environments. For example, in ad auctions it is
relevant to consider fairness both from a quality-of-service standpoint and for regulatory reasons.6
2Such goods represent resources, such as land, which can be fractionally assigned.
3An allocation is said to be envy free if, under it, every agent values the bundle assigned to her at least as much as she
values any other agent’s bundle.
4An allocation among n agents is said to be proportional if every agent values her bundle at least 1/n times the valuation
she has for the grand bundle of goods.
5Notable exceptions include the work of Amanatidis et al. [ABM16], Christoforou et al. ([CAS16]), and Nguyen et. al.
[NV13]. A discussion on these results is provided later in this section.
6Imposing fairness has been found to alleviate publicity starvation in ad auctions [CAS16]. Furthermore, incorporating
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In this work we express EF1, MMS, and NSW in terms of public value summarization function
w to obtain distinct formulations for the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods. These formu-
lations, by construction, provide fairness guarantees which can be independently validated. That is,
a bidder can verify that an allocation resulting from the auction is fair even if she is not privy to the
payments charged to (and the valuation parameters of) the other bidders. Note that, in this setting,
since the valuation of an agent is obtained by scaling the summarization function by an agent’s pri-
vate valuation parameter, the fairness requirements can be equivalently stated in terms of valuations
of the agents.
Besides fairness, our objectives conform to the quintessential desiderata of algorithmic mecha-
nism design: we aim to develop computationally efficient, truthful auctions for maximizing social
welfare. Our focus on social welfare, in particular, stems from the fact that it is a standard benchmark
in auctions; it is often thought that a seller (in competitive settings) should consider maximizing
welfare, since otherwise a competitor can potentially steal the customers by doing so.7
1.1 Additional Related Work
In contrast to the case of indivisible goods, fair division of divisible goods among strategic agents
is relatively well-studied; see, e.g., [CGG13; CLPP13; BCH+17; MN12; BGM17]. In particular, Cole
et al. [CGG13] consider proportional fairness and develop a mechanism without money to allocate
divisible items.
Mechanisms without money have also been developed for indivisible goods by Amanatidis et
al. [ABM16] and Christoforou et al. [CAS16]. At a high level, the goal of these results is to truthfully
elicit the valuations of the agents and, thereby, achieve (approximate) fairness. Unlike the setup
considered in [ABM16] and [CAS16], our focus is on auctions, where payments (money) provide a
natural means to achieve truthfulness. Furthermore, our underlying objective is to maximize social
welfare, with fairness as a constraint. [NV13] also consider fair division of indivisible goods, but
establish envy freeness in expectation.
Fairness in the context of auctions has been studied in prior work as well; see, e.g., [CFF+11;
GH03; HY11; FGL15; GHK+05; TZ15]. These results focus on envy-free pricing, i.e., they establish
fairness in terms of utilities, not valuations. Furthermore, in this line of work, envy-free pricing is
essentially considered as a surrogate for truthfulness. In particular, Goldberg and Hartline [GH03]
prove that no truthful auction that achieves a constant fraction of the optimal revenue is envy free
(with respect to the utilities). Cohen et al. [CFF+11] show that envy free pricing and truthfulness
can be achieved together only if the agents have a homogeneous capacity on the number of goods
they receive. Tang and Zhang [TZ15] consider envy-free pricing, in lieu of truthfulness, and develop
a polynomial-time approximation scheme for maximizing social welfare in sponsored search. As
mentioned previously, all the auctions developed in this work are truthful and we study fairness in
terms of valuations.8
fairness has the potential of ensuring diversity in ads and, hence, improving end user experience. In addition, fairness
guarantees in ad auctions provide a formal way to address mandates (e.g., the European Union competition law) that
forbid search engines from implementing monopolistic policies, such as advantageously displaying their own products
[Gri18].
7Social welfare is an objective of choice in real-world settings as well, e.g., Facebook’s online advertising system is based
on the VCG mechanism (that maximizes social welfare) [Met15].
8This leads to publicly-verifiable fairness guarantees.
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1.2 Our Contributions and Techniques
As mentioned previously, three central solution concepts in the context of fair division of indivisible
goods are EF1,MMS and NSW. Next, we detail our fair auctions (FA) for these three notions.
(i) FA-EF1: Envy freeness up to one good (EF1) was defined by Budish [Bud11]. This comparative
notion of fairness provides a cogent analogue of envy freeness for the indivisible case. An allocation
is said to be EF1 iff, under it, every agent values her bundle at least as much as any other agent’s
bundle, up to the removal of the most valuable good from the other agent’s bundle. Interestingly,
an EF1 allocation always exists9 and can be computed efficiently, even under general, combinatorial
valuations [LMMS04]. Another attractive aspect of this fairness notion is that it does not compromise
economic efficiency: under additive valuations, there always exists an allocation which is both EF1
and Pareto efficient [CKM+16].10
We consider the standard objective of maximizing social welfare subject to the EF1 constraints.
This problem is NP-hard (Appendix A). Complementing this hardness result, we establish an ap-
proximation guarantee for the corresponding mechanism design problem. Specifically, we show that
the problem of maximizing social welfare, under EF1 constraints, admits a 1/2-approximate, truth-
ful auction (Theorem 1). We also prove that in general single-parameter environments11 (therefore,
in multi-parameter environments) a nontrivial approximation guarantee cannot be achieved, under
standard complexity-theoretic assumptions (Appendix A). This strong negative result is in sharp
contrast to the constant-factor approximation guarantee which we obtain for single-parameter envi-
ronments with identical public valuations.
(ii) FA-MMS:Maximin share guarantee (MMS) is a threshold-based notion defined by Budish [Bud11].
This notion deems an allocation to be fair iff every agent gets a bundle of value at least as much as an
agent-specific fairness threshold called the maximin share. These shares correspond to the maximum
value that an agent can guarantee for herself if she were to (hypothetically) partition the goods into n
subsets and, then, from them receive the minimum valued one; here n is the total number of agents.
In otherwords, themaximin share is the value obtained by an execution of the cut-and-choose protocol
over indivisible goods: an agent forms an n-partition of the goods and the remaining (n − 1) agents
select a subset from the partition before the agent. Hence, a risk-averse agent will form a partition
which maximizes the minimum value over the subsets in it. Our goal is to develop a truthful social-
welfare maximizing auction subject to the constraint that each agent receives a bundle of value at
least her maximin share.
As computing the maximin share is NP-hard,12 this paper considers a bi-criteria approximation
guarantee. We show that under standard complexity-theoretic assumptions a bi-criteria approxi-
mation is unavoidable (Appendix B). We develop a truthful auction which efficiently computes an
allocation where each agent gets a bundle of value at least (1/2− ε) times her maximin share and the
social welfare of the computed allocation is at least as much as the optimal (Theorem 2); here ε > 0 is
a fixed constant.13
(iii) FA-NSW: The Nash social welfare (NSW) of an allocation is defined as the geometric mean of the
9For indivisible goods, such a universal existence guarantee does not hold with respect to envy freeness.
10In the current setup, since the valuations are scalings of the additive public value summarization function, the alloca-
tions determined by our mechanisms will always be Pareto efficient.
11In general single-parameter environments the public value summarization functions can be agent specific.
12A reduction from the partition problem proves this claim, even for additive and identical valuations.
13Note that under additive (but nonidentical) valuations anMMS allocation might not exist [PW14; KPW16].
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agents’ valuations for their bundles [Nas50; KN79]. NSW provides a measure to quantify the extent
of fairness of an allocation [Mou04; Kel97]. Specifically, for divisible goods, it is known to satisfy
strong fairness and efficiency properties [Var74]. Even in the indivisible case, if the valuations are
additive, then an allocation which maximizes NSW is both fair (EF1) and Pareto efficient [CKM+16].
Though, finding an allocation (of indivisible goods) which maximizes NSW under additive val-
uations is APX-hard [Lee17], a number of constant-factor approximation algorithms have been de-
veloped for this problem under additive valuations: [CG15] established a 2.89 approximation for
maximizing NSW, and this approximation ratio has been improved to e [AOGSS17], 2 [CDG+17]
and, most recently, to 1.45 [BKV18a]. In fact, if the valuations of the nonstrategic agents for the in-
divisible goods are identical and additive, then a polynomial-time approximation scheme (PTAS) is
known for maximizing NSW [NR14].
We consider the problem of maximizing Nash social welfare in single parameter environment;
see FA-NSW in Section 2. Specifically, we observe that, for this problem, the approximation result
from the nonstrategic setting directly leads to a truthful PTAS (Theorem 3).
In general, EF1, MMS, and approximate NSW are incomparable notions. [CKM+16] show that
MMS does not imply EF1, and vice versa. Also, simple examples establish that an approximately
Nash optimal allocation is not guaranteed to be EF1 or MMS.
Our approximation results for all the three notions are based on finding partitions of the goods
considering only their public value w. That is, we compute partitions without considering the agents’
private valuation parameters and hence the computation is bid-oblivious. We show that as long as the
jth highest (with respect to the public value) subset in the computed partition is allocated to the
jth highest bidder, the stated approximation guarantees are achieved. In addition, such a sorted
allocation leads to a monotone allocation rule and provides a truthful auction.
Our algorithms for the EF1 and MMS formulations are completely combinatorial and can be
implemented in sorting time. Given that in many applications the underlying auction has to be ex-
ecuted in real time and at scale, the simplicity and extreme efficiency of the resulting mechanisms
are notable merits. The approximation results for the EF1 and MMS formulations rely on proving
majorization inequalities; see Definition 3. In particular, for EF1 we show that all EF1 partitions ap-
proximately majorize each other (Lemma 2). This property is interesting in its own right and shows
that—independent of the valuation parameters/bids per se—as long as we allocate the partition in a
sorted manner the approximation guarantee holds. For theMMS problem, we design an efficient al-
gorithmwhich finds a (1/2− ε)-approximateMMS allocation which majorizes an optimal allocation.
For the NSW problem, one can use the fact that the valuations are identical, up to scaling. Specif-
ically, an allocation which (approximately) maximizes NSW with respect to the public valuation w
also (approximately) maximizes NSW with respect to the valuations. Therefore, using the PTAS
of [NR14] for maximizing NSW under additive, identical valuations, we obtain the desired truthful
auction. Details of this NSW result are deferred to a full version of this work and in the remainder of
the paper we focus on fairness in terms of EF1 andMMS.
2 Preliminaries
We denote an instance of the fair-auction setting I with n bidders, [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}, and m indivis-
ible goods, [m] = {1, 2, . . . ,m} by a tuple 〈[m], [n], w, (vi)i∈[n]〉. The private preference of each agent
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i is represented by a single parameter vi ∈ R+. In addition, the weight/quality of a subset of goods
S ⊆ [m], is specified through a publicly-known summarization function, w : 2[m] 7→ R+. The valua-
tion of bidder i ∈ [n] for a subset of goods S is defined to be vi w(S). Throughout, we will consider
w to be additive, i.e., w(S) :=
∑
g∈S w(g), where w(g) denotes the weight/quality of good g ∈ [m].
For ease of presentation, we overload notation and use vi ∈ R+ to denote the valuation parameter
and vi(·) to denote the valuation function of bidder i, vi(S) = viw(S). Furthermore, in this single-
parameter environment, since vis directly scale w, the fairness guarantees can be equivalently stated
in terms of agents’ valuations.
2.1 Fairness Notions
Write Πn([m]) to denote the set of n-partitions of the set [m]. An allocation A = (A1, A2, . . . , An)
∈ Πn([m]) refers to an n-partition of [m] in which subset Ai is assigned to agent i. The fairness
notions considered in this work are: EF1 andMMS.
(i) An allocationA is said to be EF1 if for every pair of agents i, j ∈ [n] there exists a good g ∈ Aj such
that vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj) − vi(g). Since vi ∈ R+ is a positive scaling term, the inequality can be rewritten
as w(Ai) ≥ w(Aj \ g) .
(ii) Given a fair division instance I = 〈[m], [n], w, (vi)i〉 the maximin share, µ, is defined as
µ := max
(P1,...,Pn)∈Πn([m])
min
j∈[n]
w(Pj).
An allocation (A1, . . . , An) is said to be MMS iff w(Ai) ≥ µ for all agents i ∈ [n]. We can define the
maximin share of an agent i asMMSi := max(P1,...,Pn)∈Πn([m]) minj∈[n] vi(Pj). Note thatMMSi = viµ
and we get that an allocation is MMS iff each agent i receives a bundle of value at least viµ. We
will also consider allocations which satisfy the MMS requirement approximately: for α ∈ (0, 1], an
allocation (A1, . . . , An), which satisfies w(Ai) ≥ αµ for all i ∈ [n], is said to be α-approximateMMS.
(iii) The Nash social welfare of an allocationA = (A1, . . . , An) is defined as the geometric mean of the
agents’ valuations,
(
n∏
i=1
(viw(Ai))
)1/n
=
(
n∏
i=1
vi
)1/n ( n∏
i=1
w(Ai)
)1/n
. Note that, for fixed positive
scalars vis, an allocation that maximizes NSW(A) := (
∏n
i=1w(Ai))
1/n also maximizes the Nash social
welfare with respect to valuations.
With these solution concepts in hand, this work considers the standard objective of maximiz-
ing welfare. Formally, given instance I = 〈[m], [n], w, (vi)i〉, the respective optimization problems
addressed by the auctioneer are
FA-EF1
max
(S1,...,Sn)
∈Πn([m])
n∑
i=1
viw(Si)
s.t. w(Si) ≥ w(Sj)− w(g)
for all i, j ∈[n] some g ∈ Sj
FA-MMS
max
(S1,...,Sn)
∈Πn([m])
n∑
i=1
viw(Si)
s.t. w(Si) ≥ µ for all i ∈ [n]
(µ isMMS value under w)
FA-NSW
max
(S1,...,Sn)
∈Πn([m])
(
n∏
i=1
vi
) 1
n
(
n∏
i=1
w(Si)
) 1
n
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2.2 Mechanism Design Terminology
This work develops a single-round, sealed-bid auction for the above mentioned single-parameter
environment. Here, the true per-unit valuation, vi, is the only strategic parameter of each agent i,
which she reports as a bid bi ∈ R+. Hence, the auctioneer has to design a mechanism for the fair-
auction instance I = 〈[m], [n], w, (bi)i∈[n]〉. In particular, the auctioneer requires an allocation rule, A,
which maps the submitted bids, bis, to an allocation, A : Rn+ 7→ Πn([m]), along with a payment rule,
p, which charges a payment of pi to agent i.
In the presence of strategic agents, who could potentially misrepresent the parameter vi, we
would like to design allocation ruleA coupled with an appropriate payment rule p such that truthful
reporting is a dominant strategy. That is, the desiderata is to develop a mechanism, (A, p), which is
dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) in addition to being fair, welfare maximizing, and com-
putationally efficient. Recall that DSIC provides strong incentive guarantees and it imposes nominal
behavioral assumptions. This property requires that for each agent, truthfully reporting her actual
valuation is a dominant strategy and it never leads to negative utility.
For allocation rule A(b1, . . . , bn) ∈ Πn([m]), write Ai(b1, . . . , bn) to denote the bundle allocated to
agent i. We consider the standard quasilinear-utility model wherein utility of agent i under alloca-
tion rule A is given by ui(A(bi, b−i, w); vi) := vi w(Ai(bi, b−i)) − pi, here bi is a bid of agent i and
b−i ∈ R
n−1
+ are the bids of all the other agents. In the current context, a mechanism (A, p) is DSIC iff
ui(A(vi, b−i); vi) ≥ ui(S(bi, b−i); vi) for all bids bi ∈ R+ and reports b−i ∈ Rn−1+ .
3 Main Results
In this work we establish the following key results
Theorem 1. There exists a polytime, DSIC mechanism that achieves an approximation ratio of 1/2 for FA-
EF1.
It is relevant to note that FA-EF1 is NP-hard (Appendix A). We further complement the approx-
imation guarantee of Theorem 1 by showing that it is NP-hard to obtain an mδ-approximation for
the analogous problem (of maximizing social welfare subject to EF1 constraints) in general single-
parameter environments; here δ > 0 is a fixed constant (Appendix A). This hardness of approxima-
tion result is obtained via an approximation-preserving reduction from the Maximum Independent
Set problem (Appendix A.2).
In the context of FA-MMS, it is relevant to note that computing the maximin share, µ, is NP-
hard. Hence, we consider a bi-criteria approximation guarantee and establish the following result in
Section 6.
Theorem 2. There exists a polynomial time, DSICmechanism which computes a (1/2 − ε)-approximateMMS
allocation with social welfare at least as much as the optimal value of FA-MMS, here ε ∈ (0, 1) is a fixed
constant.
In addition, we show that, under standard complexity-theoretic assumptions, an efficient algo-
rithm which achieves a nontrivial approximation for FA-MMS, without violating the MMS con-
strains, does not exist; see Appendix B.
In Section 7 we observe that a truthful PTAS can be developed for the third formulation.
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Theorem 3. There exists a DSIC mechanism which, for every fixed ε > 0, finds a (1+ε)-approximate solution
of FA-NSW in polynomial time.
4 Mechanism Design to Algorithm Design
An auction (A, p) is given by an allocation rule A : Rn+ 7→ Πn([m]) which maps the bids, (bi)i∈[n], to
a partition of goods, and a payment rule, p, which specifies the payment pi charged to agent i ∈ [n].
We rely on the foundational result of Myerson (Lemma 1) which asserts that for DSIC mechanisms it
suffices to construct monotone allocation rules.
Definition 1 (Monotone Allocation Rule). An allocation rule A : Rn+ 7→ Πn([m]) is said to be monotone
if for all agents i ∈ [n] and bids of other agents b−i ∈ R
n−1
+ , the allocation to agent i is non-decreasing, i.e.,
w(Ai(z, b−i)) is non-decreasing function of bid z ∈ R+. Here, w is the public value summarization function
and Ai(z, b−i) is the bundle allocated to i under the bid profile (z, b−i).
Lemma 1 (Myerson’s Lemma [Mye81]). Under a single parameter, quasilinear utility model, an allocation
rule, A, can be coupled with a payment rule, p, to obtain a DSIC mechanism, (A, p), if and only if A is
monotone. Further, the payment rule, p, which renders such an allocation rule truthful (DSIC) is unique and
is given by
pi(bi, b−i) := biw(Ai(bi, b−i))−
bi∫
0
w(Ai(z, b−i))dz
.
The payment formula simplifies further, since the underlying allocation rule is piecewise con-
stant: pi(bi, b−i) =
∑l
j=1 zj .jump in w(Ai(·, b−i)) at zj . Here, zjs are the bid values at which the allo-
cated bundle Ai(., b−i) changes.
Throughout, we will develop monotone allocations by first computing a partition,14 {Pi}i∈[n], of
the indivisible goods [m] and then allocating the jth highest (with respect to w(·)) subset from the
partition to the jth highest bidder. Formally, we call such allocations sorted.
Definition 2 (Sorted Allocation). Given a partition P = {Pi}i∈[n] ∈ Πn([m]) of the indivisible goods [m],
which satisfies w(P1) ≥ w(P2) ≥ . . . ≥ w(Pn), we say that a corresponding allocation, S = (S1, . . . , Sn) ∈
Πn([m]), is sortedwith respect to the given bids (bi)i∈[n] iff Sσ(j) = Pj , for all j ∈ [n], where σ is the order in
which the bids are sorted: bσ(1) ≥ bσ(2) ≥ . . . ≥ bσ(n).
For the two problems FA-EF1 and FA-MMS we will develop algorithms which will be bid oblivi-
ous.15 In particular, the developed algorithms will find a partition {Pi}i∈[n] of them indivisible goods
by only considering the function w(·), and not the bids bis. The input to all our algorithms will
be 〈[m], [n], w〉; this will explicitly ensure that they are bid oblivious. Since the fairness notions are
completely specified in terms of w(·), it is intuitive that a fair partition can be computed without
considering the bids. The notable property of our algorithms is that they find a partition P which
provides a “universal” approximation guarantee: as long as we perform a sorted allocation of P the
stated approximation ratio is achieved, independent of the bids per se. That is, if the jth highest
14A collection of pairwise-disjoint subsets whose union is [m].
15As mentioned previously, an analogous result for FA-NSW follows directly from the fact that the NSW objective is
scale invariant.
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(with respect to w(·)) subset of P is allocated to the jth highest bidder, then the stated approximation
is obtained.
For the two problems we first compute a partition P, using a bid oblivious algorithm, and, then,
perform a sorted allocation of P. This ensures that the resulting allocation rule not only satisfies
the desired approximation guarantee, but is also monotone. Therefore, via Myerson’s Lemma, we
obtain a DSICmechanism. These observations imply that the underlyingmechanism design problem
reduces to developing bid-oblivious algorithmswhich find fair partitionswith above-stated universal
approximation guarantee. The rest of the paper primarily addresses this algorithm design goal.
5 Proof of Theorem 1
This section presents a 1/2-approximation algorithm for FA-EF1. Recall that in this problem EF1
is defined with respect to a single, additive function w(·). Hence, if the subsets Pis of a partition
P = {P1, . . . , Pn} satisfy the EF1 condition under w, any allocation of P (independent of which
agent gets which subset Pi) will be EF1.
Our bid-oblivious approximation algorithm is simple: return any partition P = {P1, . . . , Pn}
which satisfies the EF1 condition under w; such a partition can be computed in sorting-time by
the round-robin algorithm [CKM+16]. As mentioned above, any allocation of P—in particular, the
sorted allocation—is EF1. This directly takes care of the constraints in FA-EF1. To address the ob-
jective, we prove that such a sorted allocation (independent of our choice of the partition P which
satisfies EF1) has social welfare at least half of the optimal. The approximation guarantee follows
from an interesting result (Lemma 2) which shows that all the partitions which are EF1 (under an
identical, additive function w) 1/2-majorize each other.
Definition 3 (β-Majorization:). A sequence (xi)ni=1 is said to β ∈ R+ majorize another sequence (yi)
n
i=1 iff
k∑
i=1
x(i) ≥ β
k∑
i=1
y(i) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1 and
n∑
i=1
xi =
n∑
i=1
yi.
The following “universal” approximation guarantee holds for β-majorizing sequences (AppendixA):
if a sequence (xi)i β-majorizes another sequence (yi)i, then, for any set of parameters v1 ≥ v2 ≥ . . . ≥
vn ≥ 0, we have
∑
i vix(i) ≥ β
∑
i viy(i). This guarantee, along with Lemma 2 (which shows that 1/2
majorization holds between any two EF1 partitions), imply that the sorted allocation of an arbitrary
EF1 partition is a 1/2-approximate solution to FA-EF1.16
Lemma 2. Let P = (Pi)
n
i=1 and Q = (Qi)
n
i=1 be two partitions (of the [m] goods) which satisfy the EF1
condition under the additive function w. Then, the sequence (w(Pi))i 1/2-majorizes the sequence (w(Qi))i.
Proof. Reindexing does not affect the majorizing order. Hence, without loss of generality, we assume
that w(P1) ≥ w(P2) ≥ . . . ≥ w(Pn) and w(Q1) ≥ . . . ≥ w(Qn). Also, we consider the partitions to be
16This 1/2-approximation guarantee also extend to EFX [CKM+16] constraints. An allocation P ∈ Πn([m]) is said to be
EFX if vi(Pi) ≥ vi(Pj)− vi(g) for all i, j ∈ [n] and for all g ∈ Pj . Note that an EFX allocation always exists in the current
setting [PR18]
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distinct, otherwise, the claim holds trivially. Write index iˆ := max{i ∈ [n] | w(Pi) > w(Qi)}; such an
index iˆ exists since the partitions are distinct and
∑n
i=1 w(Pi) =
∑n
i=1w(Qi). For each index ℓ ∈ [n−1]
we establish the required inequality,
∑ℓ
i=1 w(Pi) ≥
1
2
∑ℓ
i=1w(Qi), by considering two cases:
Case 1: ℓ ≤ iˆ: Since Q = (Qi)i is an EF1 partition, w(Qk) ≤ w(Qiˆ) + w(gk), for all k ∈ [n], where
gk ∈ arg max
g∈Qk
w(g). Therefore,
ℓ∑
k=1
w(Qk) ≤ ℓw(Qiˆ) +
ℓ∑
k=1
w(gk) ≤ ℓw(Piˆ) +
ℓ∑
k=1
w(gk) (1)
Write g(1), g(2), . . . , g(ℓ) to denote the ℓ highest (with respect to w(·)) goods in [m] and note that∑ℓ
k=1w(gk) ≤
∑ℓ
k=1w(g(k)). Let P(1), P(2), . . . , P(t) denote the minimum collection of subsets in the
partition whose union contains these goods H := {g(1), g(2), . . . , g(ℓ)}; here, t, the number of subsets
required to coverH is at most ℓ. Also, note that P(i)s are pairwise disjoint and each good, g(j) belongs
to exactly one of them. In addition, since Pis are indexed such that w(P1) ≥ w(P2) ≥ . . . ≥ w(Pn), we
have
t∑
k=1
w(P(k)) ≤
t∑
k=1
w(Pk) ≤
ℓ∑
k=1
w(Pk). (2)
Therefore,
ℓ∑
k=1
w(Qk) ≤ ℓw(Piˆ) +
ℓ∑
k=1
w(gk) ≤ ℓw(Piˆ) +
t∑
k=1
w(P(k)) (using Eq (1) and definition of P(i)s)
≤ ℓw(Piˆ) +
ℓ∑
k=1
w(Pk). (using (2))
The fact that w(Piˆ) ≤ w(Pk) for all k ≤ ℓ ≤ iˆ implies
∑ℓ
k=1w(Qk) ≤ 2
∑ℓ
k=1w(Pk) for all ℓ ≤ iˆ.
Hence, 1/2-majorization holds for all ℓ ≤ iˆ.
Case 2: ℓ > iˆ: Note that
∑n
k=1w(Pk) =
∑n
k=1w(Qk). Splitting the sums gives us
∑ℓ
k=1w(Pk) +∑n
k=ℓ+1w(Pk) =
∑ℓ
k=1w(Qk)+
∑n
k=ℓ+1w(Qk). That is,
∑ℓ
k=1w(Pk) =
∑ℓ
k=1w(Qk)+
∑n
k=ℓ+1(w(Qk)−
w(Pk)). By definition of iˆ, for all indices k ≥ ℓ > iˆ, we have w(Qk) ≥ w(Pk). Therefore, the
second summand on the right-hand side of the previous equation is non-negative. This implies∑ℓ
k=1w(Pk) ≥
∑ℓ
k=1w(Qk). This inequality, along with the non-negativity of w, directly establish
1/2-majorization for all indices ℓ ≥ iˆ: 2
∑ℓ
k=1w(Pk) ≥
∑ℓ
k=1w(Qk).
From Lemma 2 and the universal approximation guarantee of majorizing sequences we get that the
social welfare from any two sorted EF1 allocations P and Q is related by SW (P) ≥ 12SW (Q). This
completes the proof of Theorem 1 , which we restate below.
Theorem 1. There exists a polytime, DSIC mechanism that achieves an approximation ratio of 1/2 for FA-
EF1.
6 Proof of Theorem 2
This section addresses FA-MMS. Since computing µ (the maximin share) is NP-hard, we use the
PTAS of [Woe97] to compute an estimate µ in polynomial time which satisfies (1 − ε)µ ≤ µ ≤ µ, for
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fixed constant ε ∈ (0, 1/2). Write allocation O = (Oi)ni=1 ∈ Πn([m]) to denote an optimal solution
of FA-MMS. Note that the feasibility of O ensures w(Oi) ≥ µ for all i ∈ [n]. Let SW(O) denote the
social welfare of O. Throughout this section, by reindexing, we assume that the agents are indexed
in non-increasing order of their valuations, i.e., v1 ≥ v2 ≥ . . . ≥ vn ≥ 0.
Our algorithm, ALG, finds a partition P = (Pi)ni=1 which satisfies w(Pi) ≥
1
2µ ≥
(
1−ε
2
)
µ. We will
show that a sorted allocation ofP, sayA = (Ai)ni=1, achieves social welfare at least as much as SW(O).
Note that A will be a
(
1−ε
2
)
-approximate MMS allocation. Given that the monotone allocation rule
returns sorted allocation A, we get a DSIC mechanism that satisfies Theorem 2.
ALG partitions the goods in two sets based on their w-value: high-valued goodsH := {g ∈ [m] |
w(g) ≥ µ} and low-valued goods L := {g ∈ [m] | w(g) < µ}. It further divides L, into two disjoint
subsets, tiny goods, L1 := {g ∈ [m] | w(g) <
µ
2} and medium-valued goods, L \ L1. Clearly, the set
L \ L1 contains all the goods that are neither in H nor in L1. For analysis, we also consider two sets
H := {g | w(g) ≥ µ} and L := {g | w(g) < µ}. Since µ ≤ µ, we have L ⊆ L.
We will primarily focus on the case wherein ALG returns the partition P after Phase 4 (Step 19).17
The analysis of the remaining cases (in which either ALG terminates after Phase 1 (τ
′
≥ n) or ALG
terminates after Phase 2 (τ ≥ n)) is fairly similar.
We now show in Lemma 3 that P is approximately fair.
Lemma 3. The algorithm ALG computes, in polynomial time, an n-partition P = (Pi)ni=1 which satisfies
w(Pi) ≥
µ
2 for all i ∈ [n].
First, we note the following useful property of the optimal allocation O = (Oi)i: besides O1 (the
bundle allocated to the highest-valued agent), any bundle Oi is either completely contained in L or it
is disjoint from it.
Claim 1. For i 6= 1, either Oi ⊆ L or Oi ⊆ H .
Proof. For contradiction, say there exists a bundle Oi (with i 6= 1) such that both the subsets Oi ∩ L
and Oi ∩H are nonempty. Write g′ to be a good in Oi ∩H . Then, by swapping all the goodsOi \ {g′}
from agent i to agent 1 increases the social welfare; recall that v1 ≥ vi. Since w(g′) ≥ µ, even after
the swapping agent i is left with the singleton {g′}, which preserves the feasibility of the resulting
allocation, i.e., the MMS requirement for agent i is maintained. This contradicts the optimality of
O.
Note that L and H are disjoint. Hence, Oi ⊆ H implies Oi ∩ L = ∅. Let I∗ := {i ∈ [n] | Oi ⊆ L}
denote the bundles in O which are completely contained in L . The following claim directly follows
from the definition of I∗.
Claim 2.
∑
i∈I∗ w(Oi) ≤ w(L).
Analogous to I∗, we consider subsets in the computed partition which are completely contained
in L; in particular, write I := {i ∈ [n] | Pi 6= ∅ and Pi ⊆ L}. We will establish that all the subsets
in the computed partition are nonempty, hence set I will be the indices of all the subsets which are
completely contained in L. Note that ALG populates the first τ (see Step 13) subsets using only low-
valued goods (using L ⊆ L in Phase 1 and 2), hence, [τ ] ⊆ I . The next claim18 bounds the weight of
each of the first τ subsets formed by ALG.
17 This implies τ < n.
18In the interest of space, the proof of this claim is omitted.
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ALG: Bi-Criteria Approximation Algorithm for FA-MMS
Input : Additive w : 2[m] 7→ R+ and estimate µ
Output : Approx.MMS partition: P = {P1, . . . , Pn}
——–Phase 0: Initialization——–
1 Pi = ∅ for all i ∈ [n],H = {g ∈ [m] | w(g) ≥ µ}, L = [m] \H,L1 = {g ∈ L | w(g) <
µ
2}
——–Phase 1: Medium Valued Goods——–
2 For all the goods g ∈ L\L1, form singleton subsets P1, P2, . . . Pτ ′
3 if τ
′
≥ n then
4 Return the partition {P1, P2, . . . , Pn−1, [m] \ ∪i∈[n−1]Pi}
5 end
——–Phase 2: Tiny Valued Goods——–
6 Initialize index a = τ
′
+ 1
7 while L1 6= ∅ do
8 while w(Pa) <
µ
2 do
9 Pick a good g ∈ L1 and update Pa ← Pa ∪ {g} and L1 ← L1 \ {g}
10 end
11 a← a+ 1
12 end
13 if for the last formed subset Pa we have w(Pa) <
µ
2 then
14 E ← Pa // set aside leftover goods
15 Set Pa = ∅, and a← a− 1 // empty Pa
16 end
17 Let τ be the total number of nonempty subsets, {P1, P2, . . . , Pτ}, populated so far
18 if τ ≥ n then
19 Return the partition {P1, P2, . . . , Pn−1, [m] \ ∪i∈[n−1]Pi}
20 end
——–Phase 3: High Valued Goods——–
21 SortH in a non-decreasing order, i.e., µ ≤ w(g
′
1) ≤ w(g
′
2) ≤ . . . ,≤ w(g
′
|H|)
22 Form (n− τ − 1) singleton subsets, i.e., Pτ+i = {g
′
i} for 1 ≤ i ≤ n− τ − 1
——–Phase 4: Leftover Goods——–
23 Pn ← E ∪ {g
′
n−τ , . . . , g
′
|H|}
24 Return the partition {P1, P2, . . . , Pn}
Claim 3. For all i ∈ [τ ], we have µ2 ≤ w(Pi) ≤ µ.
Besides the leftover goods (E in Step 11), L is entirely distributed among {P1, P2, . . . , Pτ}. This
leads to the following upper bound.
Claim 4. w(L) ≤
∑τ
i=1 w(Pi) +
µ
2 .
Proof. We first note thatL = E∪(Pi)τi=1. This impliesw(L) =
∑τ
i=1w(Pi)+w(E) ≤
∑τ
i=1 w(Pi)+µ/2.
The last inequality follows from the fact that µ ≤ µ.
Recall that I∗ and I denote the indices of bundles in O and P respectively, which are completely
contained in L. We now compare the cardinalities of these sets.
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Claim 5. |I| ≥ |I∗|.
Proof. ALG populates the first τ subsets from L and goods from the setL\L are assigned as singletons
in Phase 3, or allocated to Pn; recall µ ≥ µ and L ⊆ L. We also have, for all i ∈ I \ {n}, w(Pi) ≤ µ; in
particular, for the first τ subsets via Claim 3.
First, consider the case wherein |I∗| = n, i.e., L = [m]. Here, accounting for the cumulative
weight, w([m]), shows that |I| = n as well. Specifically, the cumulative weight is at least nµ, since
w([m]) =
∑n
i=1w(Oi) ≥ nµ. Using the fact that w(Pi) ≤ µ for all i ∈ I \ {n}, we get that ALG will
necessarily construct n nonempty subsets. Thus, in this case, |I| = n.
We now address the case where |I∗| ≤ n − 1. We consider two (sub) cases, either (i) |L \ L| >
n − τ − 1, or (ii) |L \ L| ≤ n − τ − 1. The sorting in Step 16 of ALG ensures that the goods from
L \ L are assigned (as singletons) before any good from H . Therefore under (i), ALG is, in fact, able
to construct at least n − 1 subsets from L (i.e., |I| ≥ n − 1): τ from L and n − τ − 1 (in Phase 3) from
L \L. This gives us |I| ≥ |I∗|. Under (ii), all the ℓ := |L \L| goods are assigned as singletons in Phase
3. Hence, |I| = τ + ℓ. Using the previous claims, we will show that τ + ℓ ≥ |I∗|.
|I∗|µ ≤
∑
i∈I∗
w(Oi) (since w(Oi) ≥ µ for all i ∈ [n])
≤ w(L) (via Claim 2)
≤ w(L) + ℓ · µ (since w(g) ≤ µ for all g ∈ L \ L)
≤
τ∑
i=1
w(Pi) +
µ
2
+ ℓ · µ (via Claim 3)
≤
(
τ + ℓ+
1
2
)
µ (via Claim 4)
Since, |I∗|, τ , and ℓ are integers, we get τ + ℓ ≥ |I∗|.
Proof of Lemma 3. ALG ensures that for each i ∈ I we have w(Pi) ≥ µ/2: for all the subsets in
[τ ] ⊆ I , this inequality holds via Claim 3. The remaining subsets, Pi with i ∈ I (constructed in
Phase 3 of ALG), are singletons consisting of goods (from the set L \ L) each of weight at least µ and,
hence, the inequality holds for them as well. Therefore, to complete the proof it suffices to show that
|H| ≥ n − |I|. Since, this would guarantee that (in Phase 3 and 4) each of the last n − |I| subsets get
a good from H each of value µ (recall, w(g) ≥ µ ≥ µ for all g ∈ H). That is, every constructed subset
Pi satisfies w(Pi) ≥ µ/2.
The definition of I∗ implies that for all j ∈ [n] \ I∗ we have Oj 6⊆ L, i.e., Oj ∩ H 6= ∅ for all
j ∈ [n] \ I∗.19 Hence, Claim 5 gives us |H| ≥ n − |I∗| ≥ n− |I|. This establishes the stated bound for
all the computed subsets Pis.
Overall, we get that ALG, in polynomial time, computes a partition P which satisfies the (1−ε)/2-
approximateMMS guarantee. Next, we show that social welfare of a sorted allocation of P, is at least
as much as the social welfare of the optimal solution of FA-MMS problem.
Lemma 4. Let P be a partition computed by ALG and A = (Ai)i∈[n] be a sorted allocation of P. Then, the
sequence (w(Ai))i∈[n] majorizes (w(Oi))i∈[n], where O = (Oi)i∈[n] is an optimal solution of FA-MMS.
19Without loss of generality, we can assume that the subsets Ojs are nonempty.
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The following claims are used in establishing Lemma 4.
Claim 6. Let P = {P1, . . . , Pn} be a partition returned by ALG. Then, w(Pn) ≥ w(Pi) for all i ∈ [n].
Proof. If H 6= ∅, then the sorting step in Phase 3 (Step 16) guarantees that Pn receives the highest
valued good(s) in H . For every other subset Pi in P, either Pi is a singleton (with a lower-valued
good from H ∪ (L \ L)) or Pi ⊆ L (i.e., i ∈ [τ ]), in which case w(Pi) ≤ µ (Claim 3). Therefore, if H
is nonempty, the stated claim follows. On the other hand, if H = ∅, i.e., L = [m], ALG will allocate
goods so that w(Pi) ≤ µ for all i ∈ [n − 1]. Given that the cumulative weight is at least nµ, again we
have w(Pn) ≥ µ ≥ w(Pi) for all i.
Claim 7. w(Aj) ≤ w(Oj) for all j ∈ {2, 3, . . . , n}.
Proof. Let F := {i 6= 1 | Ai ⊂ L} denote the set of agents, besides agent 1, who get only the low
valued goods. Note that the bundles in F are obtained by allocating subsets from {Pi}i∈I \ {Pn};
recall that Pn is allocated to agent 1 (Claim 6). We prove this claim by considering indices in F and
in {2, 3, . . . , n} \ F separately.
(i) If index j ∈ F , then Aj ∈ {Pi}i∈I \ {Pn}. Subsets in this collection receive goods of weight at most
µ during the execution of ALG. Hence, w(Aj) ≤ µ ≤ w(Oj).
(ii) If index j ∈ {2, 3, . . . , n} \ F , then Aj /∈ {Pi}i∈I \ {Pn}. Therefore, Aj corresponds to a partition
which must have been populated after Phase 1 and 2 of ALG. Here, j 6= 1 and, hence, Aj 6= A1 = Pn.
This, in turn, implies that the subset corresponding to Aj was formed in Phase 3 and it consists of a
single good from the setH , i.e., w(Aj) ≥ µ. In other words, in this case we must have |H| 6= ∅. Write
h := |{f 6= 1 | Af ∩H 6= ∅}| to denote the number of bundles in A, besides A1, which contain a good
from H . These h bundles are singletons (see Phase 3) and satisfy w(Af ) ≥ µ. Furthermore, since
the subsets in {Pi}i∈I \ {Pn} are of weight at most µ, without loss of generality we have that in the
sorted allocation A2, A3, . . . , Ah+1 are bundles formed from H . Therefore, the index j must satisfy
2 ≤ j ≤ h+ 1.
Analogous to h, we consider h∗ := |{f 6= 1 | Of ∩H 6= ∅}|. In particular, write O(1), O(2), . . . O(h∗)
to denote the h∗ optimal bundles (besides O1) which contain a good fromH . Each O(f) is a singleton
(Claim 1) and we index them such that w(O(1)) ≥ w(O(2)) ≥ . . . ≥ w(O(h∗)). Using Claim 5 and
the fact that ALG allocates goods from H as singletons (besides the ones assigned to A1 = Pn) we
get h ≤ h∗. Furthermore, the sorting in Step 17 ensures that the lowest (in terms of weight) h goods
from H are allocated as singletons in Phase 3. Therefore, w(O(i)) ≥ w(Ai+1) for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , h}.
Since w(Oi+1) ≥ w(O(i)) for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , h} (the optimal bundle is necessarily sorted), we get the
desired inequality w(Oj) ≥ w(Aj) for the index j.
Proof of Lemma 4 . The cumulative weight of the goods remains same irrespective of the allocation,∑n
i=1w(Ai) =
∑n
i=1w(Oi). Hence,
∑k
i=1w(Ai) =
∑k
i=1 w(Oi) +
∑n
i=k+1w(Oi) −
∑n
i=k+1w(Ai) for
all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . n − 1}. Applying Claim 7,
∑n
i=k+1w(Oi) −
∑n
i=k+1w(Ai) ≥ 0. Therefore, the stated
inequality holds:
∑k
i=1w(Ai) ≥
∑k
i=1 w(Oi) for all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . n− 1}.
The analysis above focused on the case in which ALG returns the partition P after Phase 4. In
the complementary cases (wherein ALG terminates after Phase 1 or Phase 2) the fairness guarantee
(Lemma 3) is directly achieved. In addition, in these cases we have the following bounds: µ2 ≤
w(Pi) ≤ µ ≤ µ for all i < n and w(Pn) ≥ µ+
∑n−1
i=1 (µ − w(Pi)) ≥ µ (Claim 6). Using these facts, one
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can show, as before, that the majorization guarantee (Lemma 4) continues to hold. Therefore, even if
ALG terminates before Phase 4, we have SW(A) ≥ SW(O).
Hence, we get that the sorted allocationA assigned to the agents satisfies the required fairness and
welfare guarantees. Overall, using this sorted (monotone) allocation rule we get a DSIC mechanism
which establishes Theorem 2.
7 Proof of Theorem 3
This section describes a DSIC mechanism for FA-NSW. NSW is a scale-free objective; in particular,
the following equality holds for any v1, . . . , vn ∈ R+, argmax(Q1,...,Qn)∈Πn([m]) (
∏n
i=1 viC(Qi))
1/n =
argmax(Q1,...,Qn)∈Πn([m]) (
∏n
i=1C(Qi))
1/n.
Hence, an allocation that (approximately) maximizes the Nash social welfare under the addi-
tive function w(·) is a (approximate) maximizer of FA-NSW. Constant-factor approximation algo-
rithms are known for maximizing Nash social welfare under additive valuations [CG15; AOGSS17;
CDG+17; BKV18a]. In fact, Nguyen and Rothe [NR14] provide a PTAS for this problem when
the valuations of the agents are additive and identical. Hence, in a bid oblivious manner and for
any fixed ε > 0, we can find a partition, P = {P1, . . . , Pn}, in polynomial time which satisfies
(
∏n
i=1 w(Pi))
1/n ≥ 11+ε max(Q1,...,Qn)∈Πn([m]) (
∏n
i=1 w(Qi))
1/n.
A sorted allocation of P continues to satisfy this approximation guarantee. Hence, the monotone
allocation rule described in Section 4 leads to a DSIC mechanism which satisfies Theorem 3 (restated
next).
Theorem 3. There exists a DSIC mechanism which, for every fixed ε > 0, finds a (1+ε)-approximate solution
of FA-NSW in polynomial time.
The PTAS in [NR14] is not combinatorial–it uses the integer programming algorithm of Lenstra [LJ83].
We can, however, obtain a combinatorial (and extremely efficient) mechanism for FA-NSW using the
1.061-approximation algorithm developed in [BKV18b].
Also, note that the Nash social welfare approximation guarantee does not require a sorted allo-
cation of P. This requirement is used to only ensure monotonicity of the allocation rule. In fact, for
NSW under additive valuations, we can achieve a 1.45 approximation in general single-parameter
environments. Specifically, if wi : 2[m] 7→ R+ is an additive public value summarization function
of agent i and vi ∈ R+ is her valuation parameter, then, by definition, the value that agent i has a
subset of goods S ⊆ [m] is viwi(S).20 Hence, using the algorithm of Barman et al. [BKV18a], we can
efficiently find a 1.45-approximation to a Nash optimal under wis. A sorted allocation of such an
approximate solution leads to the stated guarantee for general single-parameter environments.
8 Conclusion and Future Work
This paper studies fair allocation of indivisible goods among strategic agents. In particular, we de-
velop truthful and efficient mechanisms which are (approximately) fair in terms of EF1, MMS and
optimizing NSW. Under EF1 andMMS, we focus on the fundamental objective of maximizing social
welfare and obtain constant-factor approximation guarantees (bi-criteria in theMMS case).
20In single parameter environment wi is equal to w for all agents i ∈ [n].
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Going forward, it would quite interesting to address revenue maximization. Note that in the
standard Bayesian framework the virtual valuations of the agents can be negative. Hence, it is not
clear if bid oblivious algorithms exist when the objective is to maximize expected revenue: if the
virtual valuations of all the agents are negative then an empty allocation is both fair and optimal. On
the other hand, if all the virtual valuations are positive then we must assign the entire set of goods
to obtain high revenue. This separation highlights the fact that, when maximizing revenue, it is not
clear if one can decide on the “right” subset of goods to allocate without looking at the bids.
Improving the approximation factors and considering non-additive public value summarization
functions (e.g., submodular) also remain interesting directions for future work.
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A EF1 supplements
A.1 Hardness of FA-EF1
This section shows that the decision version of FA-EF1—i.e., the problem of finding a social welfare
maximizing EF1 allocation—is NP-hard by reducing the partition problem to it. The decision version
of FA-EF1 and the partition problem are as follows:
Decision version of FA-EF1: Given valuation parameters v1, . . . , vn, an additive function w :
2[m] 7→ R+ over m goods along with a threshold τ , does there exist an EF1 (under w(·)) allocation
S = (Si)
n
i=1 that satisfies
∑n
i=1 viw(Si) ≥ τ?
Partition Problem: Given a set of integers A = {a1, . . . , am}, such that
∑m
i=1 ai = 2B, find a 2-
partition {P1, P2} of A which satisfies
∑
ai∈P1
ai =
∑
ai∈P2
ai = B.
Theorem 4. FA-EF1 is NP-hard.
Proof. Given an instance of the partition problem, A = {a1, a2, . . . , am}, we construct an instance of
FA-EF1 with two agents and (m+1) goods. With a positive integer v, we set the valuation parameters
of the two agents as v1 = v and v2 = v − ǫ. The additive function w is set to satisfy w(i) = ai for
all 1 ≤ i ≤ m and W (m+ 1) = B + ǫ, with ǫ > 0 and B + ǫ > maxi=1,··· ,m ai. Furthermore, let the
threshold be τ := 3Bv + ǫv − ǫB.
Next, we show that a balanced partition {P1, P2} exists if and only if, in the constructed instance
there exists an EF1 allocation with social welfare at least τ .
For the forward direction, say in the given partition instance a 2-partition {P1, P2} satisfies
∑
ai∈P1
ai =∑
ai∈P2
ai = B. Note that the allocation S := (S1, S2), with the first agent’s bundle S1 := P1∪{m+1}
and the second agent’s bundle S2 := P2 is EF1. In addition the social welfare of this allocation is
equal to τ .
2∑
i=1
viw(Si) = v(2B + ǫ) + (v − ǫ)B
= 3Bv + ǫv − ǫB
= τ
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We now prove the other direction using a contrapositive argument. In particular, we assume that
the given partition instance does not admit a balanced partition.
Say, P1 and P2 are subsets such that (P1 ∪ {m + 1}, P2) is an EF1 allocation. Note that {P1, P2}
corresponds to a 2-partition of A. Hence, by the assumption that the underlying partition instance
does not admit a balanced partition, we get w(P1) 6= w(P2). Write w(P1) = ∆ and w(P2) = 2B −∆.
The EF1 condition ensures that ∆ < B; equality does not hold since w(P1) 6= w(P2).
There are two possible allocations, either P1 ∪ {m + 1} is allocated to the first agent or to the
second. We show that in both of these cases the social welfare is strictly less than τ .
If P1 ∪ {m+ 1} is allocated to agent one, then the social welfare is
v(B + ǫ+∆) + (v − ǫ)(2B −∆)
= vB + vǫ+ v∆+ 2Bv − 2Bǫ−∆v +∆ǫ
= 3Bv + ǫv − ǫB − ǫ(B −∆)
< τ
Otherwise, if agent two gets P1 ∪ {m+ 1}, the social welfare is
v(2B −∆) + (B + ǫ+∆)(v − ǫ)
= 2vB − v∆+ vB + ǫv + v∆−Bǫ− ǫ2 −∆ǫ
= 3Bv + ǫv − ǫB − ǫ(ǫ+∆)
< τ
Hence, in both the cases theEF1 allocation fails to achieve the thresholdwelfare τ . This completes
the proof.
A.2 Hardness of Maximizing Social Welfare Under EF1 Constraints and Heterogeneous
Valuations
This section considers EF1 in a setting wherein the valuations of the n agents over the m goods are
not necessarily identical. In particular, we show that under additive valuations, vi : 2[m] 7→ R+, for
agent i ∈ [n], the following problem does not admit a nontrivial approximation.
max
(S1,...,Sn)∈Πn([m])
n∑
i=1
vi(Si)
s.t. vi(Si) ≥ vi(Sj)− vi(g) for all i, j ∈ [n] and some g ∈ Sj
We call this problem HET-EF1 and establish an approximation preserving reduction to it from
the maximum independent set problem.
Given a graph G = (V,E) we construct a HET-EF1 instance such that the graph has an indepen-
dent set of size at least k if and only if the constructed HET-EF1 instance achieves social welfare at
least k − 1. Set the number of goodsm = |V | and the number of agents n = |E| + 1. For every edge
ei = (uj , uk) ∈ E, we have an agent i such that vi(uj) = vi(uk) = ε = O(1/n2) and vi(u) = 0 for all
u /∈ {uj , uk}. Agent 0 values each good at one, i.e., v0(u) = 1 for all u ∈ [m].
Let S = (Si)ni=0 denote an optimal solution of the constructed HET-EF1 instance. The following
lemma shows that the cardinality of the bundle allocated to agent 0, i.e., |S0|, dictates the social
welfare of S .
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Claim 8. The social welfare of an optimal allocation S = (Si)
n
i=0, SW(S), satisfies |S0| ≤ SW(S) < |S0|+1.
Proof. By definition, SW(S) =
n∑
i=0
vi(Si) = |S0|+
n∑
i=1
vi(Si) ≥ |S0|.
Furthermore, since vi(Si) ≤ 2ǫ, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and ǫ = O(1/n2), we have SW(S) = |S0| +
n∑
i=1
vi(Si) ≤ |S0|+ ǫ|E| ≤ |S0|+ 1/n < |S0|+ 1.
Claim 9. The bundle allocated to agent 0 (i.e., S0) corresponds to an independent set in the given graph G.
Proof. For contradiction, say uj, uk ∈ S0 for an edge ei = (uj , uk) of the graph.
In such a case, vi(Si) = 0 and vi(S0) = 2ǫ. In addition, even after a good (uj or uk) is removed from
S0, agent i will continue to envy agent 0, which contradicts the fact that (Si)ni=0 is an EF1 allocation.
Therefore, S0 is an independent set.
Lemma 5. In the given graph G, the maximum independent set is of size t if and only if the optimal social
welfare in the constructed HET-EF1 instance is between t and t+ 1.
Proof. If G has an independent set of size t, then allocating the corresponding set of goods to agent 0,
we get that the social welfare is at least t. Note that such an allocation is EF1.
Furthermore, if the optimal social welfare is equal to t+ δ, where 0 ≤ δ < ǫ|E| < 1, then Claim 8
implies that agent 0 is allocated t goods. Therefore, using Claim 9, we have thatG has an independent
set of size at least t.
The previous lemma shows that there exists an approximation preserving reduction from the
maximum independent set problem to HET-EF1. Since maximum independent set cannot be effi-
ciently approximated within |V |δ (assuming NP 6⊆ ZPP), for a constant δ > 0 [Has96], we get the
following theorem.
Theorem 5. For a fixed constant δ > 0, there does not exist a polynomial-time mδ-approximation algorithm
for HET-EF1, unless NP ⊆ ZPP.
Note that an m-approximation for HET-EF1 can be obtained by first finding a maximum weight
matching between the agents and the goods, and then—with this partial allocation in hand—executing
the algorithm of Lipton et al. [LMMS04].
A.3 Approximation Guarantee for β-Majorizing Sequences
The following lemma is well known under the majorization order (i.e., for β = 1); see, e.g.,[MOA11].
Here, for completeness, we provide a proof for general β ∈ (0, 1].
Lemma 6. If sequence (xi)i β-majorizes sequence (yi)i, then for any set of valuation parameters v1 ≥ v2 ≥
. . . ≥ vn ≥ 0 the following inequality holds
∑
i vix(i) ≥ β
∑
i viy(i). Here x(i) and y(i) denote the ith largest
element in the two sequences, respectively, and parameter β ∈ (0, 1].
Proof. Reindex the sequences such that x1 ≥ x2 ≥ . . . ≥ xn and y1 ≥ y2 ≥ . . . ≥ yn and, hence, the
following inequality is satisfied for all k ∈ [n− 1]
k∑
i=1
xi ≥ β
k∑
i=1
yi (3)
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Note that, for any k ∈ [n]
k∑
i=1
vixi =
k−1∑
ℓ=1
ℓ∑
i=1
(vℓ − vℓ+1)xi + vk
k∑
i=1
xi
=
k−1∑
ℓ=1
(vℓ − vℓ+1)
ℓ∑
i=1
xi + vk
k∑
i=1
xi
≥
k−1∑
ℓ=1
(vℓ − vℓ+1)
(
β
ℓ∑
i=1
yi
)
+ vk
(
β
k∑
i=1
yi
)
(using (3) and the ordering vℓ ≥ vℓ+1)
= β
k−1∑
ℓ=1
(vℓ − vℓ+1)
ℓ∑
i=1
yi + βvk
k∑
i=1
yi
= β
k∑
i=1
viyi
Hence, the claim follows.
B MMS Supplements
This section establishes the hardness of maximizing social welfare subject to approximate maximin
constraints. Given a fair division instance I = 〈[m], [n], w, (vi)i〉, with additive function w(·), comput-
ing the maximin share, µ := max(P1,...,Pn) minj w(Pj), is NP-hard. Thus, finding a feasible solution of
FA-MMS is computationally hard as well. However, using the PTAS developed in [Woe97], for any
fixed ε > 0 and additive functionw, one can find a (1−ε)-approximateMMS allocation in polynomial
time.
In light of this PTAS (and other approximation results [AMNS15; PW14; BK17; GHS+18]), one
must address the complexity of a relaxation of FA-MMS where the allocations are required to be
approximately maximin fair. We show even this version of the problem is computationally hard, i.e.,
for a fixed α ∈ (0, 1), we prove the following is NP-hard.
max
(S1,...,Sn)∈Πn([m])
n∑
i=1
viw(Si) (FA-AMMS)
subject to w(Si) ≥ αµ for all i ∈ [n].
Theorem 6. For any α ≤ 1/4, FA-AMMS is NP-hard.
Proof. Weprovide a reduction from the partition problem. Given a set ofm integersW := {w1, w2, . . . , wm},
the objective in the partition problem is to determine if there exists a 2-partition of [m], say (P1, P2)
such that
∑
j∈P1
wj =
∑
j∈P2
wj , i.e., the goal is to find a balanced partition of the given set of integers.
We will construct an instance of FA-AMMS with (m + 3) goods and three agents such that the
social welfare of the constructed instance is at least 10T iff the underling partition instance admits a
balanced partition; here T := 12
∑m
j=1wj . In addition, we set the approximation factor α = 1/4. This
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will establish the stated hardness result. In particular, we consider a fair-division instance with v1 = 1
and v2 = v3 = 0 for the three agents. Here, for the firstm goods the weight is defined by equating to
the given integers: w(j) := wj for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m. The weight of the (m+ 1)th and the (m+ 2)th good
is set to be 3T (recall T = 12
∑m
j=1wj). Finally, for the last good we have w(m+ 3) := 4T .
Note that the maximin share of the constructed instance, µ, is at most 4T . The total weightw([m+
3]) is equal to 12T . Therefore, the average between the three agents is 4T . Since µ cannot exceed the
average, the stated bound follows. Next, we show that µ is equal to this average iff there is balanced
partition of the given set of integers.
Claim 10. The maximin share, µ, of the constructed instance is equal to 4T if and only if the underlying
partition instance admits a balanced partition.
Proof. The reverse direction of this claim is direct. If (P1, P2) is a balanced partition then assigning
good (m + 3) to agent 1 along with the bundles P1 ∪ {m + 1} and P2 ∪ {m + 2} to agents 2 and 3,
respectively, ensures that µ = 4T .
Consider the case in which the partition instance does not admit a balanced partition. Here, we
will show that, for any allocation (A1, A2, A3) ∈ Π3([m+3]), the following bound holdsminiw(Ai) <
4T . We can assume that the (m + 3)th good is allocated as a singleton; otherwise redistributing the
goods allocated with this good does not reduce µ below 4T . Say, A1 = {m+3}. In case the (m+1)th
and the (m+ 2)th good are allocated together, say the are in bundle A2, then the stated bound holds
w(A3) ≤ w([m]) = 2T < 4T . Otherwise, if the (m+ 1)th and the (m+ 2)th good are allocated to, say,
agents 2 and 3, respectively, we havemin{w(A2 \ {m+1}), w(A3 \ {m+2})} < T . The last inequality
follows from the fact that the partition instance does not admit a balanced partition. Therefore, we
have min{w(A2), w(A3)} < 4T .
First wewill show that if there exists a balanced partition of the given set of integers then the social
welfare of the constructed FA-AMMS instance is at least 10T . For a balanced partition {P1, P2}, we
have w(P1) = w(P2) = T . Therefore, the allocation with bundlesA1 = {m+1,m+2,m+3}, A2 = P1
and A3 = P2 is 1/4-approximate MMS; recall α = 1/4 and (in this case) µ = 4T . Furthermore, the
social welfare of this allocation is equal to 10T . We complete the proof by establishing that if the given
partition instance does not admit a balanced partition then the social welfare is strictly less than 10T .
Write β := max
(Q1,Q2)∈Π2([m])
min
i
w(Qi). The nonexistence of a balanced partition implies that β < T .
Write (P1, P2) ∈ argmax(Q1,Q2)∈Π2([m])miniw(Qi). Considering the allocation ({m+3}, P1∪{m+
1}, P2 ∪ {m + 2}), we get that the maximin share of the constructed instance is at least β + 3T .
Therefore, the approximate maximin share value imposed in FA-AMMS is strictly greater than β i.e.
1
4
µ ≥
1
4
(β + 3T ) > β.
Note that a feasible allocation for FA-AMMS, say A = (A1, A2, A3), must satisfy miniw(Ai) ≥
1
4µ > β. This implies that we cannot partition just the first m goods between agents 2 and 3 to
obtain a feasible allocation: in particular, if A2 ∪ A3 ⊆ [m], then min{w(A2), w(A3)} ≤ β which
contradicts the feasibility ofA. Therefore, one of the last three goods, {m+1,m+2,m+3} has to be
assigned to either agent 2 or agent 3. Say, the (m+2)th good is not assigned to agent 1, then we have
w(A1) ≤ w(m + 3) + w(m + 1) + w([m]) ≤ 4T + 3T + 2T = 9T . Analogously, in the other cases one
can argue that w(A1) ≤ 9T . Overall, we get that the social welfare is strictly less than 10T , whenever
the given instance does not admit a balanced partition. This completes the proof of the theorem.
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